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sible in any sense that would create a greater ordinal, and if not, the contradiction disappears. Mr. Russell's new theory leads him to the conclusion that there can be no totality of all ordinals (p. 261), so he dismisses this contradiction on practically the same grounds.

The reason, it seems to me, why Mr. Russell's theory of types solves the contradictions, is that it is a rediscovery of the concept of universe of discourse, and of the distinction between connotation and denotation. This paper does not pretend to give a complete account or criticism of the logic. It is enough if it serves to strengthen a suspicion that its author believes to be prevalent amongst many philosophers, namely, that the new logic is nothing but the old logic dressed up in new clothes; and the author would add that, inasmuch as these new clothes are borrowed from a highly technical science which is a closed book to many, it is an unnecessarily inaccessible form; and it may even be that this rediscovery, if such it prove to be, has not yet progressed as far as its prototype had gotten. If so, to recognize the kinship might further its development, and any studies tending to confirm or to destroy this suspicion should be welcome.

HAROLD CHAPMAN BROWN.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY.

SOCIETIES

THE TENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

An excellent arrangement of the program by the executive committee and an almost absolute power wisely wielded by the presiding officer made possible the great success of this meeting. There was general approval of the unification of the program by selecting for reading only those papers whose subjects were more or less closely connected with the principal topics under consideration, with a resulting gain in time for the discussion, which was allowed to run on as long as it seemed profitable. A partial rearrangement of the program was found advisable, and several papers were withdrawn by their writers during the meeting so as to allow still more time for discussion, which proved unusually enticing and instructive. The opinion was expressed that the plan of unifying the program could be carried even a step further by selecting one principal topic for discussion and announcing this as early in the year as possible. The discussion during the meeting, though sharp and incisive, was permeated by an honest desire to come to a mutual understanding. Great credit is due to the authors of the "Platform of Six Realists," whose views were the main topic for discussion, for having had the courage and ability to formulate a number of propositions on which they found an agreement possible. The platform thus far published is only a first attempt, but its effect has already been most clarifying. It is a matter of regret that some of the statements made during the meeting regarding the *special problems* underlying the tenets of the platform could not have been incorporated in the platform paper itself. It was quite apparent that some of the arguments against the new realism were moving in the realm of a different generating problem. The importance of the concept problem was well emphasized in Professor Montague's remark that the process of discovery has nothing to do with the question of validity. A clearer recognition of the principle here indicated, that the assumptions necessary for the solution of a definite problem do not affect, and may even contradict, the assumptions necessary for the solution of a different problem, and a definite renunciation of the principle of self-evidence as a valid court of appeal, would pave the way for a better understanding and more fruitful discussion of the issue presented by the new realism. These things were in the air during the meeting, and they produced the feeling (at least in the present writer) as of the dawn of a new day in philosophy, not produced by the radiance of an overpowering genius-to-come, but by the initiation in philosophy of that *cooperation* compared with which the work of even the greatest genius pales.

Professor Miller opened the meeting with "An Examination of Four Realistic Theories of Perception." He called them, respectively, the picture theory, the window theory, the doorway theory, and the sunshine theory. The first speaks of an object not mental and its picture in the mind. The second takes the "awareness of an object" as an ultimate fact. In the third the object plants itself in the doorway of the mind, but continues to be in the physical world if we turn our attention away; the object being itself "mind-stuff" or simply "stuff." The last is an "efflux-theory," which identifies the efflux with the object. The following difficulties were urged against these four theories. The first duplicates the object, for which there is no warrant in our experience: we do not "see double." The second does not account for illusions; how do we even know that there is a "window"? The third does not seem to take account of the machinery of perception: it takes time to make an impression. The last is a refinement of the picture theory, but has nevertheless its defects. The speaker disclaimed any attempt to refute the new realism in pointing out these difficulties. And he expressed himself in sympathy with the platform idea.

In the lively discussion which ensued Professor Woodbridge suggested that Professor Miller's difficulties sprang from his fundamental assumption of mind as a room and perception as a process by which things appear. Do not start thus, he said, and the whole problem is radically changed. It is hard to state this contrasted view. But the problem of vision will then become simply a problem of mechanics, and the whole problem of how a thing appears in mind is eliminated. Professor Marvin suggested the addition of a fifth theory of perception which he called the "out-of-doors" or "fresh-air" theory. There we start on a level where there are no illusions, namely, with the raw material which is the source of all our problems.

This whole train of thought was well continued in the second paper, in which Professor Woodbridge discussed "The Belief in Sensations." As a special example of the lack of clear concepts in psychology, so strangely contrasting with its great practical success, he specified the term "sensation." What difference is there between tone and sensation, between red and sensation? If there is a difference between them, specify it; if not, what are they? And yet, in spite of this lack of clearness about the nature of sensations, they are considered in our psychologies as the elements of mind! The usual evidence for the belief in sensations was discussed under four heads, the "relativity of sensations," "dreams and illusions," "pain and similar experiences," and "introspection." The evidence was dismissed as insufficient to establish the existence of sensations in the subject, and a restatement of the problems therewith presented was given in terms of the organism and its reactions. "Things which have been called sensations are stimuli to thought and behavior, but not the constitutive elements of mind!" Even introspection does not disclose sensation, but only "things sensed." On the other hand, Professor Woodbridge did not mean to offer a substitute for sensation, because he held that even the demand for a substitute sprang from a philosophical confusion. He would replace the problem of sensation by the following two: "(1) What, as matter of fact, are the objects with which we are consciously familiar?" and "(2) What are the causes of the appearance of consciousness?" But these are problems of positive science, not of epistemology.

It was to be expected that so remarkable a paper would be vigorously attacked. To Professor Lovejoy it appeared like an invitation to go back to infancy. It is very well for neo-realists to urge us to go out-of-doors; but we *are* indoors. The dualistic difficulty has broken out. What are we going to do about it? Miss Calkins found herself in agreement with part of Professor Woodbridge's paper, especially his demand for more careful definitions, his small regard for the parallelistic theory as a fundamental method in psychology, and even his denial that we introspect sensations: color is best explained as "supposedly existing red character." But she vigorously protested that the whole theory "is utterly one-sided" in that it completely omits the "self" which immediate consciousness gives us. Professor Sheldon held that thoughts are something qualitatively different from sensations and saw in this a menace to the realist. Professor Miller declared he did not know what Professor Woodbridge was trying to prove: we must understand facts by categories! Professor Woodbridge, in replying, turned particularly against the charge that neo-realism meant an invitation to return to infancy. He reminded the audience that most of the neo-realists had been for years idealists. It was not their lack of acquaintance with idealism, but its inherent insufficiencies, which drove them to neo-realism.

The discussion of neo-realism, which had sprung up with the very first paper of the meeting, was now officially opened by Professor Dewey. He did not wish to be considered an out-and-out opponent of neo-realism. His criticism was directed merely against certain points of method. He considered that the neo-realists, or at least some of them, had tried to reach conclusions about *existence* by developing purely *conceptual* implications. As evidence of this he referred (1) to the doctrine that "certain principles of logic are logically prior to all scientific systems," and (2) to the prominence given to the theory of the "externality of relations." After expressing his full agreement with the neo-realists in their opposition to idealism, he proceeded to the discussion of the following two questions: "(1) How far is realism preferred as a *positive* body of doctrines? (2) How far does the logical analysis of the logic of propositions enter into the determination of this positive body of doctrines?" "Mental" may be defined in terms of "implication." On what grounds, then, do realists deny that logical entities are mental? Is it not at least a discussable hypothesis that "number" is a transformation of a physical fact for purposes of implication? A thing thus would undergo a change in becoming an "inferential thing." His question was not whether the knowledge relation modifies *its* terms; but whether, assuming things to exist independent of and prior to the knowledge relation, they undergo a change in *becoming* terms of a proposition. On what grounds do neo-realists deny this?

The afternoon session was opened by Professor Perry, who spoke, in place of Mr. Pitkin, in behalf of the neo-realists. The main problem of neo-realism is the reconciliation of independence and immanence; and its principle is: terms may enter into relations without forfeiting their identity. It is opposed to nominalism, it is opposed to sensationalism: logical entities belong to the texture of reality. It is in sympathy with modern logic. Idealism gives man a preeminent position in the universe, which realism denies. In reply to Professor Dewey he maintained that logic is prior to other systems. Analysis reveals abstract entities, such as unity, relation. This structure is more universal than the particular objects. But you must add particular characters to get the particular object. The logical plane intersects things; what is true of them logically is true so far as it goes. Neo-realism does not deny an *indirect* modification of the object by the knowledge relation; for knowledge may cause *action.* In discussing this principle of neo-realism, that the knowledge relation does not modify the object, it must be understood in the light of this stricter interpretation. Here is a desk; realism takes it to exist with its properties; I glance at it, or in any other way establish a knowledge relation; then this new fact does not modify the desk. That I *know* "$2 + 2 = 4$" does not affect the logical relation expressed in the equation.

The discussion which followed these papers of the two leaders was participated in by many speakers. Professor Marvin: Ought philosophers ever to indulge in existential propositions? Should they not rather take the existential propositions which science has given us? Professor Spaulding: The method of the neo-realists is purely empirical. We find that any science of objects necessarily presupposes that these objects are not modified by our studying them. This is true in physics. Professor Dewey has assumed it in his own studies. Start with the contrary assumption, namely, that an object is modified by the knowledge relation; is *that* process known without modification? Professor Dewey: You ask the same type of questions as Professor Royce does. Knowledge is a process with a purpose. Its outcome justifies it. Professor Spaulding: Professor Dewey takes the genetic view of knowledge. But first he studies the genesis of his own knowledge. And here he implies a logical doctrine: his knowing does not modify the object known at least in this case. And this is the essence of realism: objects can be known as they are and as if the knowing were not taking place. Professor Montague: Realism is a protest: the process of *discovery* has nothing to do with the question of *validity.* Genesis has no relevancy to truth. Professor Ormond: One way of getting to knowledge is by the logic-process. Would it not follow that our successive acts of knowledge do modify the object of knowledge? Professor Montague: Professor Ormond is not taking "modify" in the precise sense defined by Professor Perry. Professor Spaulding: How would you find out, *how much* knowledge modifies the object? Professor Ormond: Such a question can only be answered by experience. Professor Norman Smith: Professor Dewey's question has not been answered, namely, whether *getting* into consciousness makes a difference. Professor Horne: The usual objection to the method of introspection in psychology is that the object of introspection is modified by the act of introspecting. Here, then, seems to be at least one class where modification of the object by the knowledge relation is admitted. Another is the social point of view: It makes a difference to us to be known. How did realists get outside of knowledge to know what the object-not-known is?

Miss Calkins concluded the discussion for the day with her paper "The Idealist to the Realist." It consisted of a refutation of criticisms on idealism, and an attack on the positive doctrines of neo-realism. Realists claim that their principles are demanded by science and logic. But idealism can not be subversive of logic, if logic is defined as the formulation of the laws of consistent thinking. And if science demands the distinction between object and subject, this is possible and necessary on idealistic grounds; for we know ourselves as bounded; this boundary is the other-than-myself, the beyond; and yet it must be mental, for I know it; it can only exist as known. This is not an assumption on the part of idealism, but a discovery, the result of analysis. Empiricists are guilty of an unblushing willingness to sacrifice empirical fact to logic when they argue from the "externality of relations" to the independence of objects from the mind. The ubiquitousness of the "ego" is not a "predicament," but a significant fact. The distinction between shared and unshared experience is an expression of such an empirical fact. Solipsism is not a necessary consequence of the idealistic starting point. Regarding the positive doctrines of the neo-realists, the most important are the conceptions of reality in scientific terms. But are these in no sense conditioned by being known? Analysis reveals that "atoms," "ether," "energy" are simply ways of knowing; they reduce to sense-qualities or relations, *i. e.*, to ideal terms. Our objects are found to be simply complex forms of experience.

In the evening the president, Professor Bakewell, addressed the association on "The Problem of Transcendence," which will be published in full in the official report of the meeting.

The session was opened Wednesday morning by Professor Montague's paper "The New Realism and the Old." He attempted to specify the definite problem which the new realism attacks and the realm to which the propositions of the platform should be restricted. It is not a problem of "ontology," but of "epistemology"; even here a distinction is necessary between the methodological question of the sources and criteria of knowledge, and the simple question "whether or not the known exists independently of the fact that it is known.'' The latter alone is the problem of neo-realism. He sketched three historical solutions of this problem: natural realism, epistemological dualism, and subjectivism, and showed the deficiencies which prohibit the unqualified acceptance of any one of these. Neo-realists are amending natural realism; in particular the objections arising out of the problems of illusions, dreams, and the relativity of sensations were met by declaring all these to be real, not merely apparent, relations between objects, and by distinguishing them as ''binary'' from the so-called real, namely, ''triadic'' relations. Properties are not due to the knowledge relation, but to the relations of objects to objects. And the brain is one such object.

Professor Pratt: Would sound be existing even if there were no ear? Professor Montague: We do not know whether sound depends on an ear or extra-organic relations. Professor Miller: The same tree will appear green to the near, bluish to the distant observer. Are both to be considered properties of the tree? We would then have a multitude of attributes in relation to possible perception at different removes. Miss Calkins: A number of idealists here have been united on one point at least,—the impossibility of a purely internal world; whether they express this in the form: I and the world; or, the will and the beyond; or, I know myself as thwarted; in each case they maintain that one immediately knows more than one's own self. The most important question to the realist is: How can you explain illusions by calmly calling in brain and sense-organs and objects in space? They are just what is in question: *What is the object?* Professor Keyser: It can be proved equally well that all things are mental or that all things are non-mental. We prefer the first hypothesis merely because everybody is certain that at least some logical entities are mental. Professor Dewey: This shows that it is a wrong method to confine yourself to conceptual elaboration. If I were a neo-realist I should be aware that mathematics has played into the hands of idealism. Imagine that idealism had disappeared with its presuppositions, what problems would be left? Professor Marvin: In our discussions here two distinct meanings of logic have come to light. The first is a study of the knowing process. The second has nothing to do with ''knowing.'' Realists take logic in this second meaning. Professor Ormond: I offer a new definition of neo-realism. It is a ''solipsism of the object.'' Professor Lovejoy: More adherence to definitions is required, if we want to come to an understanding. Appoint a committee to define the fundamental terms which are to be used in the discussion. Professor Perry: Realists disclaim the Cartesian axiom. *Cogito ergo sum* is not a prime certainty. Professor Spaulding: Cognition need not be studied before things are known.

Professor Hibben then opened the discussion of "The Value for Philosophy of Mathematical Methods and Ideals." Mathematics is a phase of logic developing the necessary implications of certain fundamental postulates. The possibility of extending knowledge by mathematics beyond the limits of observation depends "on the manner in which the mathematical system articulates with our real experience." This point of articulation is the original postulate. On it depends therefore the value of mathematical prediction. Can we develop philosophy *geometrico more?* No; because the fundamental conditions underlying philosophy are too complex to be expressible in a limited number of postulates. The conquests of mathematics suggest, however, the possibility of a fundamental unity underlying a general Weltanschauung. In this sense mathematics will remain an ideal of philosophy.

Dr. Brown, the second leader of this discussion, held that mathematics has to philosophy no more intimate relation than any other science. All mathematics begins as a representation of reality and remains thus in so far as it is significant. But it does not copy reality. Its concepts are symbols which signify operations on reality; their value is to be judged by their success. Novelties are only apparent in a deductive system; the propositions are merely more serviceable forms of the same essence which is implicit in the postulates. As regards the value of the deductive system form for philosophy, we must distinguish a constructive and a reconstructive use of this form. Neither is applicable in philosophy; the former, because philosophical systems grow by the aggregation of new facts, mathematical systems by the development of their implications; the latter, because the number of fundamental concepts and postulates which are required is too great in philosophy, owing to its great complexity. Dr. Schmidt: It is unfortunate that the value of mathematical methods and ideals, which I consider very great, should have been discussed by two speakers who both argued on the negative. It is significant that their results are based on a certain conception of the deductive system form which is open to doubt in essential points. A careful study of this form as exhibited in mathematics should prove a fruitful subject of philosophical inquiry. It seems also important to call attention to the success of mathematical methods already attained in the field of logic. The complexity of philosophical presuppositions can not be argued against the application of the deductive system form, so long as they have not been exhibited. But no form whatever can make unsound reasoning sound; a good form, however, enables us to detect flaws more readily. Professor Keyser: I call attention to an error in the two papers, namely, that Euclidean geometry agrees with experience better than non-Euclidean. Both "agree" with experience; but Euclidean geometry has proved more convenient so far.

In the afternoon Professor De Laguna examined the "Externality of Relations" in three different aspects. It has its origin in the distinction of *essence* and *accidents,* as the latter are either non-essential qualities or *relations.* Externality of relations means here "external to the essence," *i. e.,* to the defining attributes. The validity of this distinction depends therefore on the possibility of "adequate definition." If anywhere, this must be possible in mathematics. But here this theory of the externality of relations is unsound, because the meaning of its indefinables is determined only by their relations to each other in the axioms, just as the meaning of words is determined by their connections, their relations to each other. But the externality of relations may be conceived also as "externality to qualities," whether essential or not. Here no precise decision is possible, because the distinction itself is not precise. Lastly, we may understand the externality of relations as meaning independence of relations from each other. In this sense it is, at least in part, decidedly wrong. And we have no reason for assuming that the relations in which an object stands form distinct groups each of which is independent of the rest.

Professor Cohen followed with his paper on "The Present Situation in the Philosophy of Mathematics." Starting from the customary view that mathematics is a deductive science, we are struck by the so-called "problem of the New," namely: how can mathematics genuinely extend our knowledge? The fact itself admits of no doubt; the question can therefore merely be: how can it be accounted for? He examined the empiricist explanation that the axioms are the result of experience; Kant's appeal to "pure intuition"; and Poincaré's recent attempt to mark out the method of "mathematical induction" as the fountain of the "New." None of these seemed to Professor Cohen capable of accounting for the fact of the "New." In his own attempt at solution he pointed out (1) that mathematical reasoning is not confined to the syllogism; (2) that the syllogism is not reducible to mere identity. He then discussed the problem of the objective validity of mathematics. Again, the fact itself admits of no doubt; the problem is to account for it. He discussed in turn the answer of empiricism, of transcendental idealism, and of pragmatism. He maintained that the assumption of the mental nature of mathematical entities is based on the erroneous notion that the particular alone has existence. On the contrary, it seems necessary to assume also the existence of universals, though they can not be localized in space, and though their mode of existence may be different from that of particulars. Dr. Schmidt: I agree with Professor Cohen in urging the problem of the "New" and with his criticism of the usual attempts to account for it. I doubt, however, whether Professor Cohen has himself succeeded in giving a satisfactory solution. The main importance of the problem lies, to my mind, in the indication it gives that something is wrong with our ordinary conception of a deductive system. Professor Lovejoy: The New is only apparently existent in a deductive system. In the syllogism we must already have established the conclusion "Socrates is mortal" in order to be able to start with "All men are mortal." Dr. Schmidt: This may be admitted in this particular syllogism; but it only proves that Socrates might now be excused from serving in the same old example. Better examples would make it evident that Professor Lovejoy's view is not correct.

Professor Keyser's paper on "The Asymmetry of Imagination" required some knowledge of mathematics. Let

$$E \equiv u_1x_1 + u_2x_2 + \cdots + u_nx_n + 1$$

where u_k and x_k are real numbers. Then $E = 0$ is a symmetrical equation. We will give to the x's and u's different interpretations. Starting with the equation

$$u_1x_1 + u_2x_2 + 1 = 0,$$

let x_1, x_2 be the coordinates of a *point* in Cartesian coordinates. Then the equation will represent a straight line. We shall call this straight line the image, $I(u)$, corresponding to the concept, $T(u)$, namely, the equation. But we may also give the u's a definite meaning; let us understand by them the coordinates of a *line;* then our equation will represent a point, formed by the intersection of an infinity of straight lines. We will call this the $I(x)$ corresponding to the $T(x)$. As x and u are interchangeable, we have perfect symmetry in the equation which holds good in the image. This still obtains when we treat the equation

$$u_1x_1 + u_2x_2 + u_3x_3 + 1 = 0$$

correspondingly. But in

$$u_1x_1 + u_2x_2 + u_3x_3 + u_4x_4 + 1 = 0$$

the corresponding images $I(u)$ and $I(x)$ lose their symmetry: $I(u)$ can still be imagined; but $I(x)$ can not. We discover thus a certain asymmetry of the imagination, whilst thought still remains perfectly symmetrical. Professor Sheldon: This corroborates the results obtained recently by some German psychologists, namely, that thought and imagination are totally different. It opens up a novel method of treating the problem of the *a priori.* If these results are correct, they ought to alter our methods of philosophizing. We have tried to cling to the concrete. Now it must be urged: don't think in concrete terms; let thought have free play. Miss Calkins: You may be as concrete (*i. e.,* individual) as ever; but you must let the relational have its place as well as the sensational.

On Thursday morning Professor Britain spoke of "The Logical Value of the Genetic Explanation." He distinguished two types of valuation, the one exact, capable of being agreed upon, the other inexact, not subject to common agreement. The "standard of explanation" was taken to be of the second type. "The perfect explanation, implying as it does the ultimate solution of both the ontological and cosmological problems, is a task too stupendous for human intelligence. And yet it stands logically as the only perfect form of explanation, though forever undefined, real though never realized." With this ideal of explanation before him, Professor Britain rebelled against scientific procedure which definitely limits its problems in order to arrive at definite solutions. And on it is based his criticism of the genetic method. As an internal criticism of the genetic method Professor Britain pointed out that "it has no definite starting-point, covers no stated period, nor can it assign any reason why these should be as they are rather than otherwise." Professor Gore: The remedy for this, it would seem, is: *more* genetic method. Professor Lovejoy: Professor Britain's ideal of explanation is hazy and would exclude the only kind of explanation of which we have any definite knowledge, namely, the scientific. Professor Cohen: Professor Britain has indicated some at least of the arbitrary presuppositions of the genetic method.

Professor Sheldon's paper showed, in definite instances, the effect of two "Ideals of Philosophic Thought" in determining the reasoning of those who hold them. He called them the "aristocratic" and the "democratic" ideal. They are mostly latent in philosophic discussions, beyond proof or refutation, and whilst not really contradictory to each other, they determine opposing views in those who hold them, and are consequently a source of perennial quarrels. The first, held by Bradley and others, takes reality to be something deeper or higher than common, every-day experience; it postulates ultimate principles to which experience-content must conform to attain the dignity of reality. Two of these principles are: (1) that everything must be grounded in everything else, *i. e.,* the principle of sufficient reason; (2) that every term is simply itself and nothing else, *i. e.,* the principle of identity. The second ideal (of which Dewey and James are representatives, also Betrand Russell) takes reality as that which is directly present here and now, and regards that which is beyond such concrete verification as ghostly and illusory. It denies any ultimate principles except those directly useful in attaining results here and now. Professor Norman Smith: There is no cleavage between two parties such as Professor Sheldon represents; both realists and idealists rely on logic and on fact. Bradley is not a representative of idealism; he stands by himself, a scholastic in modern times, a student neither of the history of philosophy nor of science. Professor Urban: There are certain presuppositions which underlie both realism and idealism, which are not logical, and which can best be called values. Idealism has made great advances since it recognized value as a fundamental idea, as Münsterberg did. Dr. Schmidt: Two important points of method seem to have come to light during this meeting; one is the fundamental rôle of the concept problem which limits the validity of our fundamental assumptions; the other is the necessity of determining an ideal of philosophic thought, as this will determine the solutions of our philosophic problems. Here lies the great value of Professor Sheldon's paper, in that he has shown in definite examples just this determining effect of two ideals. Professor Spaulding: I do not admit Dr. Schmidt's contention that the validity of our fundamental propositions is limited by our problems. It is a significant fact that all philosophical systems are stated in the form of propositions. Dr. Schmidt: I agree with this, and it is significant; but it does not invalidate my statement.

Professor Singer's paper, "Mind as an Object of Observation" criticized the "analogy argument" for the existence of a mind in other bodies: it assumes wrongly that our mind is directly known only to ourselves, it is invalid as an inference from a single case, and the hypothesis of other minds refers to the "jenseits" of things that make a difference. It fundamentally misconceives "mind" as something which is to be added to the body, an eject. This is brought out by the example of an "automatic sweetheart" invented by James. James's shrinking from accepting here the consequences of his own pragmatic method proves disappointing. The difference between soul and no-soul is merely a question of the fuller or poorer experience. "Our belief in consciousness is an expectation of probable behavior based on an observation of actual behavior." This recognition of consciousness as behavior provides a definite method for finding out what consciousness means, even though it is impossible to know surely what aspect of the behavior of certain objects leads us to call them conscious. Professor Singer finds one root of the analogy argument in the (erroneous) assumption of English sensationalism, namely, that "I am immediately possessed of certain data, recognizable and namable each by itself." "The beginning of our epistemological building is not a datum which might be known by itself, . . . but just any point at which it occurs to us to ask ourselves: What is it you know, and how do you know it?'' A second, and still deeper, root of the wrong conception of a soul presupposed by the analogy argument he finds in the ''instinct for adding.'' As a primitive physical science added to a body another called heat to produce the hot body, so we add to a body another, called soul, to make it a live body, we compose a real sweetheart out of an automatic sweetheart plus an eject. Physical science has outgrown this stage. Soul is still considered a mystery by philosophers. ''Is it not time to recognize the meaninglessness of the mystery?'' Professor Ormond took exception to Professor Singer's view of life.

In the concluding paper of the meeting, ''Some Problems confronting the Intellectualist,'' Professor Shaw showed the historical development of activism and its effect on intellectualism. This influence concerns the framing of the problem of reality and the formulation of the doctrine of truth. Starting with the distinction between appearance and reality, Professor Shaw showed that the intellectualist may conceive of being as that which appears and acts; ''being is expected to exist *in sensu, in actu, et in re.*'' The Lockean formula should be modified so as to read: *nihil est in intellectu quod non ante fuerit in actu.* This theory of reality finds support on the psychological side in Wundt's theory of attention and in Judd's conception of ''active behavior and conscious experience as complementary forms of the ego's existence.'' The new theory of truth emphasizes the rôle of human interest, whether, like Eucken, in the form of a ''spiritual creativeness,'' or ''along the path of instinct,'' where Bergson seeks truth. Professor Shaw pointed out dangers in this theory, but concluded that the intellectualist ought to admit that ''there is truth in desire,'' as well as that there is ''reality in activity.''

KARL SCHMIDT.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Natural and Social Morals. CARVETH READ. London: Adam and Charles Black. 1909.

The title of this book is intended to be descriptive. Morality is natural to man " in the sense that it is necessary not merely to his existence, but to the development of all that is distinctively human." And morality is social because man, in respect both of his existence and his development, is essentially social. No exception can be taken to this contention, and it gives to the whole book a certain pertinence and liveliness that are lacking in many ethical treatises. But the author's other preliminary